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Tuesday, May 2, 2006

With Iran in the Background, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU Challenge

by Dr. Christos P. Ioannides*

Last Tuesday, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice paid a very brief visit to Athens where she met with Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyiannis. The main topic of discussion was the simmering crisis over Iran and its nuclear program. Ms. Rice's objective was to solicit Greek support for Washington’s plans vis a vis Iran that might include the use of force. Earlier, the Secretary of State was in Ankara discussing the same subject with the Turkish leadership.

The Greek response to Ms. Rice was mixed. Greece is less than enthusiastic over the prospect of using force against Iran. Turkey is even cooler for that matter. Both countries have foreign policy headaches of their own.  Turkey, especially, fears that an American attack on Iran might open Pandora’s Box and make the question of Kurdistan even more vexing and threatening to Turkey than it is today. As it transpires, the American objective of spreading democracy in Iraq, which means, among other things, the consolidation of the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds, is at odds with Turkish objectives in the area.  Ankara fears that the more democratic Iraq gets and the more the Iraqi Kurds assert their autonomous status, the more likely it is that Turkey’s 14 million Kurds will demand their basic human rights and worse, for Turkey, demand autonomy or even independence, joining their Iraqi brothers in quest of an independent Kurdistan, this in the not distant future.

Where do Greece and Cyprus come into this Middle Eastern mixture, or labyrinth, rather? For one thing, Washington does not want any new Greek-Turkish crisis over Cyprus or the Aegean at a time when the war in Iraq is ongoing, a potentially enormous crisis with Iran is looming, the Israelis and Palestinians are deadlocked, while terrorists blow up people in Tel Aviv and Egyptian resorts in the Sinai.  In addition, Washington is extremely keen that Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union move forward without any problems or delays. Both Greece and Cyprus, however, being full members of the 25-member EU could complicate matters for Turkey. The Bush administration however, through Secretary Rice, made it abundantly clear to Athens that Washington expects both Greece and Cyprus to facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU. This American expectation and demand, in fact, is one- sided, as it does not require any reciprocity from Turkey. In the end, through this position, Washington favors Turkey because both Greece and Cyprus have very good and very legitimate reasons to expect that Turkey fulfill its political, and legal obligations first, before it can join the EU. These are the EU expectations as well.

Let me be a little more specific. In the case of Cyprus, Turkey continues the illegal military occupation and colonization of the northern part of the island refusing to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. When Turkey signed in Luxemburg the EU Accession Agreement of October 3, 2005, it also undertook a legal commitment to establish normal relations with all 25 EU members, including Cyprus. After all, Cyprus is a EU member, and it is only logical that the candidate for membership, Turkey, should recognize all the members of the club, the EU, it is seeking to join.

It should also be noted that Cyprus, like all other EU members, has a veto right over Turkey’s accession, even more so, because Turkey continues, since 1974, the military occupation of 38% of the Cyprus Republic’s territory. Yet, little Cyprus went along with the rest of the EU and approved the commencing of negotiations with Turkey. Still, one of the first legal obligations of Turkey was to expand the customs union with all EU members. This includes the opening of its ports and airports to Cypriot commercial shipping, which is substantial and to Cypriot airlines. Until today, Turkey refuses to fulfill the conditions set by the Protocol it had signed on October 3rd, 2005. In turn, this might cause a serious delay of Turkey’s drive to gain accession to the EU and could lead to what Olin Ren, the EU enlargement commissioner, called  “a train wreck:  A collision between Turkey and the EU that will lead to a disaster, for Turkey mainly.

Equally important in terms of Turkey’s most elementary obligations under EU rules and requirements, is that EU members or candidate for membership, shall refrain from the use or threat of military force to settle any dispute with other members. Still, Turkish law stipulates that it constitutes a casus belli the expansion to 12 miles of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean. As if to affirm that the use of force is on the table in its relations with EU member Greece, the Turkish air force has been engaged in the systematic violation of Greek airspace in the Aegean flying also over several Greek islands. From the perspective of international law and the Law of the Sea specifically, Greece does have every legitimate right to expand its territorial waters to 12 miles. It has not done so but, under the Law of the Sea, maintains this right to do so in the future.

There is also another area related to Turkey’s obligations to the EU that is also affecting Greek-Turkish relations. It has to do with religious freedom in Turkey and the treatment of the Ecumenical Patriachate of Constantinople.

At the present, when Turkey is negotiating its accession to the EU, Greek Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Patriarchate are still under pressure. Recent actions of the Turkish government do not indicate a basic change of attitude as Ankara keeps using the Patriarchate, as a means to pressure Greece and Cyprus. These measures include: The refusal to reopen the Chalki Theological School. The continued arbitrary confiscation of Church property (Vakouf).  The creation of insurmountable obstacles for the repair of a Greek Orthodox Church that was damaged after the November 2003 car bombing of the British Consulate by Muslim extremists. Moreover, the neo-fascist Grey Wolves group is allowed to threaten the Patriarch, calling for his expulsion.  The latest incident was during Epiphany and the Patriarch’s blessing of the water in the Bosporus. Very importantly, Prime Minister Erdogan himself disputed the Ecumenical character of the Ecumenical Patriachate and prohibited Turkish officials from attending a reception at the American Embassy honoring Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, a truly enlightened hierarch. Such behavior towards the Ecumenical Patriarch, the spiritual leader of 350 million Easter Orthodox who has also been a champion of religious tolerance, is incompatible with the most fundamental European Union principle of respecting religious freedom.

Still, despite all this, Greece has emerged as one of the strongest champions of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Indeed, during the December 17, 2004 EU Brussels summit, Greece threw its full support behind Turkey’s membership in the EU. The Greek, and Cypriot logic for that matter, has been that it is in the interest of Greece and Cyprus to have a European and democratic Turkey as neighbor because this would lead to a changed Turkish behavior in the Aegean, and over the Cyprus issue. A truly European Turkey, under a moderate Islamic and genuinely democratic regime, will be a good, peaceful neighbor of Greece and Cyprus.

But things have not worked exactly that way.  On the one hand and over the last decade there has been an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, especially after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. There has also been great expansion in economic relations. The latest example is the acquisition by the National Bank of Greece of 46% of the shares for $2.7 billion of the Turkish Finansbank. Also there has been a significant expansion in citizens’ contacts, tourism and academic exchanges between Greece and Turkey.

On the other hand, however, there has not been any fundamental change in Turkey’s aggressive posture in the Aegean.  There are continued challenges of Greek sovereign rights through the systematic violation of Greek airspace and the less frequent but equally illegal violation of Greek territorial waters. Moreover, Turkey disputes the sovereignty of a number of smaller Greek islands, like Imia, by designating them as “Grey Zones” And above, all, as mentioned, Turkey maintains its casus belli if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles.

All these constitute a great anomaly for the EU. In the final analysis, despite his reformist agenda, when it comes to foreign policy and to critical issues such as Greece and Cyprus (and the Kurdish question one might add), Prime Minister Erdogan--whose intention might have been to reach an accommodation with Greece--has been obliged to follow the Kemalist military establishment, something that indicates the limits of the Turkish Premier’s power. But unless Turkey ends its military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and removes the threat of military force against Greece, both of them, being members of the EU, will be judging Turkey’s compliance with EU conditions and norms, and Ankara’s path to the EU will be even more tortuous than it is today. This will be especially the case if Turkey provokes a new crisis over the Aegean and Cyprus, something that is not far fetched to occur in the next few months. This is a highly risky Turkish policy vis a vis the EU, however, because it will, in all likelihood, lead both Greece and Cyprus to reassess their support for Turkey’s accession.  And increasingly, Greece and Cyprus will be finding more allies in the EU to thwart Turkey’s drive to join the EU as Turko-skepticism is on the rise in the EU as a whole. 

*Dr. Ioannides is Director of the . The views expressed above are strictly his own.

Contact Dr. Ioannides at: xpioannides@hotmail.com